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Integration of a nationally procured electronic
health record system into user work practices
Kathrin M Cresswell*†, Allison Worth† and Aziz Sheikh†
Abstract
Background: Evidence suggests that many small- and medium-scale Electronic Health Record (EHR)
implementations encounter problems, these often stemming from users’ difficulties in accommodating the new
technology into their work practices. There is the possibility that these challenges may be exacerbated in the
context of the larger-scale, more standardised, implementation strategies now being pursued as part of major
national modernisation initiatives. We sought to understand how England’s centrally procured and delivered EHR
software was integrated within the work practices of users in selected secondary and specialist care settings.
Methods: We conducted a qualitative longitudinal case study-based investigation drawing on sociotechnical
theory in three purposefully selected sites implementing early functionality of a nationally procured EHR system.
The complete dataset comprised semi-structured interview data from a total of 66 different participants, 38.5 hours
of non-participant observation of use of the software in context, accompanying researcher field notes, and hospital
documents (including project initiation and lessons learnt reports). Transcribed data were analysed thematically
using a combination of deductive and inductive approaches, and drawing on NVivo8 software to facilitate coding.
Results: The nationally led “top-down” implementation and the associated focus on interoperability limited the
opportunity to customise software to local needs. Lack of system usability led users to employ a range of
workarounds unanticipated by management to compensate for the perceived shortcomings of the system. These
had a number of knock-on effects relating to the nature of collaborative work, patterns of communication, the
timeliness and availability of records (including paper) and the ability for hospital management to monitor
organisational performance.
Conclusions: This work has highlighted the importance of addressing potentially adverse unintended
consequences of workarounds associated with the introduction of EHRs. This can be achieved with customisation,
which is inevitably somewhat restricted in the context of attempts to implement national solutions. The tensions
and potential trade-offs between achieving large-scale interoperability and local requirements is likely to be the
subject of continuous debate in England and beyond with no easy answers in sight.
Background
The literature is littered with examples of “failed” elec-
tronic health record (EHR) implementations in health-
care settings, and particularly large-scale ones although
these are, in the light of the significant anticipated bene-
fits, increasingly pursued internationally [1-6]. A recur-
ring theme in this literature is that of clinicians finding
it difficult to integrate the use of information technology
(IT) systems into their work practices and care provision
[6-20]. As a result, end-users may either partially use
(i.e. only use the parts that they perceive as useful),
develop “workarounds” (which we define as behaviour
employed by users to overcome a perceived limitation in
a technical system), or avoid using the system altogether
("non-compliance”) [21-23]. These coping strategies may
in turn lead to the technology being used in ways other
than originally intended or not being used at all, which
can result in important disturbances to organisational
functioning and worse still compromise patient safety
[24].
This literature indicates that difficulty integrating
technology with the work practices of healthcare staff is
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particularly likely in situations in which a new system is
perceived as being imposed on users [21]. Integration of
EHRs with user work practices is therefore a central
concern for large-scale national ventures where system
design often reflects a focus on interoperability (i.e. the
ability meaningfully to exchange information between
systems). A key challenge then is to design a system
that is able to deal with the potentially multiple (at
times conflicting) requirements of different stakeholders
and within different user groups in an environment that
is characterised by complexity and variability [19,25]. It
is however also important to use the technology to facil-
itate change and to implement an (agreed) change man-
agement programme on the back of this, rather than
seeking simply to replicate existing processes.
As part of its national strategy, England procured three
commercial EHR systems to be implemented in hospitals.
These included Cerner Millennium, Lorenzo Regional
Care (henceforth referred to as Lorenzo), and RiO.
Lorenzo (described in Table 1) was planned to be imple-
mented across the North, Midlands and Eastern region of
England and was intended to be used in 219 hospitals.
Our study drew on a subset of data obtained as part of a
national evaluation of EHRs in English hospitals [26-28].
However, the focus of this work was a more in-depth
exploration of the consequences of Lorenzo on both indi-
vidual and collective work practices and stakeholder rela-
tionships. Our rationale for focusing on this particular
type of software was that the system was implemented in
consecutive releases, gradually replacing paper systems,
which meant that changes in work practices could be
traced over time and in more detail than would have been
possible with a more rapid roll-out.
This work was informed by socio-technical principles
and drew on Actor-Network Theory (ANT) [29,30], which
helped us to investigate how the centrally procured EHR
software has played an active role in shaping social rela-
tionships. This fluidity and interrelated nature of social
and technical processes is often neglected in the technolo-
gical determinism that typically dominates IT implementa-
tion strategies and views humans as passive recipients of
technological innovation [31]. We therefore explored how
the new technology has shaped professional practice and
what consequences these changes had for organisational
functioning, record keeping and patient care.
Methods
Design
We conducted a longitudinal comparative case study
undertaking field work between February 2009 and
November 2010. The majority of data were collected in
three “early adopter” National Health Service (NHS) spe-
cialist care providers (henceforth referred to as ‘sites’)
implementing early releases of Lorenzo in England. We
conceptualised these as case studies to take into account
local contingencies [29,30,32-35]. Our focus was on
exploring the micro-environment of implementation and
adoption, but without neglecting the wider implementa-
tion context (i.e. the national implementation environ-
ment), which was found to impact heavily on local
developments [27,28].
Sampling
We purposefully sampled sites from among the first few
to implement Lorenzo software. Sampling criteria
included the range of different settings (e.g. mental
health, community, acute) and the timeframes of imple-
mentation (i.e. it had to begin during our study period).
Within each case study site, implementation team
members were initially approached for interviews and
observations through the local head/director of IT. We
then used snowball sampling, asking individual partici-
pants to recommend further interviewees, actively seek-
ing a range of different viewpoints. Individual users
were initially recruited with the help of IT managers,
ward managers and heads of service (again asking for
recommendations of further interviewees). In doing so,
we sampled a range of staff groups including both junior
and senior nurses and doctors, allied health profes-
sionals and administrative staff.
Data collection
As work practices are heavily context dependent, we
focused on collecting qualitative data through interviews,
Table 1 Description of the properties of the nationally procured type of software that was the focus of our
investigation
Lorenzo Regional
Care
Developed by iSOFT in India and implemented by the Computer Sciences Corporation as part of England’s national strategy
The system was developed as it was being implemented and had releases with increasing capabilities that were implemented
consecutively
In the initial release, the system and paper processes were run in parallel as system capabilities were limited including clinical
notes and requesting
The second release replaced the existing Patient Administration system but this was only achieved in one hospital during our
research
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observations and documents in the three selected sites.
These data collection approaches helped us to gain an
insight into local contingencies, as well as more general
processes across settings and over time.
We conducted semi-structured interviews with users
(i.e. those who were expected to use the technology
within their everyday work including doctors, nurses,
allied health professionals and administrative staff) and
other hospital staff (e.g. managers, IT staff and clinical
leads) in order to gain an insight into their experiences of
using the new system. Particular issues explored included
views and attitudes relating to the system and implemen-
tation strategy (if relevant over time), perceived chal-
lenges and changes to individual and collaborative
working, and potential suggestions for improvements
(see Table 2 for an indicative topic guide). The wide
range of interviewees sampled allowed us to gain an
insight into the consequences for individuals as well as
for wider organisational functioning, which is dependent
on effective collaborative working. The first round of
interviews (Time 1) was conducted during early use,
when sites had implemented the technology for between
three months and one year. Where possible, interviews
were conducted longitudinally, speaking to the same
stakeholders around six months later (Time 2) in order
to trace potential changes in attitudes and investigate
the effects of more embedded use of the system. This
temporal component also helped us to assess the local
consequences of the continuously changing political
and economic climate. This was particularly important
in the context of the national implementation, as changes
in national arrangements often had significant
consequences for hospital staff. These included, for
example, delays in implementation timelines (or conver-
sely pressures to implement), and changes in strategic
direction such as reduced software functionality [27].
In order to gain an insight into the more informal work
practices of users, interviews were complemented by a
mixture of object/activity/person-oriented observations
of the software in use with on-site questioning, where
appropriate and convenient. This involved “following the
thing” (i.e. the software) and the various ways in which it
was used and talked about in the clinical setting (e.g. by
observing activities that involved the software) [36].
Hospital-specific documents, including project initia-
tion documents, ‘lessons learned’ documents and local
evaluation reports, were also collected in order to investi-
gate the more formal (i.e. official or desired by manage-
ment) changes to work practices. These included
documents drafted before the system was implemented,
outlining planned changes to work practices. We used
these as a comparator to actual observed changes.
In order to examine concurrent developments in the
wider political and economic landscape, we conducted
additional semi-structured interviews with stakeholders
outside sites. Interviewees here included governmental
stakeholders, developers and representatives from the
independent sector.
Data handling and analysis
Transcribed interviews, observations, researcher field
notes and documents were coded with the help of
NVivo8 software [37], drawing on both deductive and
inductive coding approaches [38]. We began by building
Table 2 Sample topic guide employed in interviews
Questions Can you tell me what you use Lorenzo for and how it contributes to patient care?
What were your expectations before Lorenzo was put into use and were they fulfilled?
How disruptive is the associated organisational change, for example in terms of learning new routines, new staff recruited, and needing
to familiarise yourself with new practices?
Has your behaviour/practice changed as a result of the introduction of Lorenzo? If so, in what way? Are there any unexpected changes
to how you do things now?
Do you see Lorenzo influencing your working style as part of a team or as a professional? (Prompt: e.g. in the way you communicate
and collaborate with other health professionals and communicate with patients)?
Can you tell me what, if any, might be the main benefits to you in your role from using Lorenzo? Do you see these benefits now? Are
there any clear drawbacks in performing your role?
Do you have any concerns about the introduction of Lorenzo? Can you tell me what these are?
Are there any tasks or aspects of care that you feel will become more difficult or worse with the introduction of Lorenzo?
Are there any changes that you would like to see made in how Lorenzo works? How could it be improved to be more acceptable and
more effective in supporting care?
What, if anything, would you miss most about Lorenzo if it were withdrawn?
Did you have any problems when you first started using the system? How were these resolved?
Do you have sufficient skills now to use Lorenzo to the maximum benefit?
In what ways do you think Lorenzo will be/is a) better and b) worse than the system(s) it replaces? Why? (Probe: how did the ‘old’ one
look-paper or mix of paper and electronic)?
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a coding framework based on the existing literature sur-
rounding technology implementation and associated
challenges with integration into user work practices [6].
This formed the deductive part of our analysis and
included dimensions of integration of the system with
professional responsibilities, existing roles and routines,
and changes in individual and collaborative working.
The inductive part of the analysis involved recording of
new themes emerging from the data. Evolving categories
from these themes were fed back into subsequent data
collection. In investigating how exactly the software
shaped both individual and collective work practices (i.e.
the micro-context), drawing on ANT proved particularly
useful [39,40]. In doing so, our focus was on the active
impact of the new technology on work practices of
users, as it was beginning to replace established paper
processes in the organisations. These insights were then
used to draw conclusions about the wider environment
in which these practices were situated by a constant
process of “zooming in” and “zooming out” [39,40]. This
approach helped us to build on the literature and gain a
holistic picture of the implementation and adoption
landscape whilst still allowing new themes to emerge.
As the focus of the study was on exploring changes to
user work practices, this category was investigated in
more detail first within and then across cases and data
sources as well as time points [41]. Triangulation was
facilitated by using the query function in NVivo8, which
allowed extracting data from different data sources and
collection times, and drawing up thematic tables record-
ing emerging issues in each data source, time-point,
group of interviewee, and individual location.
We discussed findings in regular team meetings and
kept a research journal capturing our emerging under-
standing of the cases. During the analysis process, we
paid particular attention to reflecting on our own
assumptions and the way we had reached our interpreta-
tions, seeking potential alternative explanations. This was
achieved by testing whether these better explained the
data, ensuring that findings did not occur due to chance,
searching for evidence that may refute explanations, and
by following up unexpected findings [41].
Ethics
The observational component of this study received
ethical approval from the East London and the City
Research Ethics Committee on the 2nd of April 2009.
The interview component submitted for ethical review
to the same ethics committee but was classed as a ser-
vice evaluation on the 9th of October 2008 (08/H0703/
112). To protect the anonymity of participants and
Trusts, we have removed potential identifiers wherever
possible.
Results
We collected data through interviews with 66 users and
other hospital staff, carried out 38.5 hours of observa-
tions, collected 13 hospital-specific documents, and con-
ducted interviews with 14 stakeholders outside the
immediate hospital environment. A summary of data
collected in each case study site is provided in Table 3.
This also shows a breakdown of the number of different
participating professions.
As a result of our inductive analysis, we were able to
identify a number of important factors relating to the
integration of Lorenzo with user work practices. These
are outlined in detail in Table 4 and included the fol-
lowing main categories:
• Software characteristics and associated
consequences
• Coping strategies employed by software users in
different contexts
• Direct and indirect knock-on effects.
We elaborate on these themes below with supporting
illustrative data (further data are available on request
from the corresponding author).
Software characteristics and associated consequences
The software in question was nationally procured, which
meant that organisations, although to some extent free
to choose which ‘releases’ (i.e. versions) they wished to
implement, were presented with a fixed set of core
releases that allowed limited customisability at either an
organisational or group/individual user level. This
reflected the then government’s central desire to see
interoperability. This was seen to be particularly impor-
tant in the context of a state-run national health service.
However, the focus on interoperability resulted in poor
alignment between local work processes and software
specifications. Users thus frequently expressed concern
that the software lacked fitness for purpose and/or
usability.
“Two fundamental criticisms remain that the system is
not, and what you see on the screen is not intuitive, in
other words if you haven’t been taught, haven’t used it
regularly enough to remember what all the sequences
are, so if you’re only dipping into it occasionally it is
actually very, very difficult because it is, you cannot sort
of automatically think well this is what I want to do
next and look at it and say that’s what I do ... the other
criticism of it is the speed of the system that you don’t,
when you expect to move from one field to another it is
not instant and that is a big concern in a system where
one feels instinctively that it ought to be.” (Interview,
Consultant, Time 2)
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The limited ability to customise the software meant
that it was difficult to adapt to suit local needs, which
often resulted in significant increases in users’
workloads.
“Somebody rang me, 5-10 minutes on the phone, and it
takes you, one time it took me over 50 minutes to do it all
because it’s a phone call, going downstairs to get the file
cause you still have to have the file, finding the file, bring-
ing that up then logging on, waiting, cause I just did this
one thing and then putting it all on, trying to print it and
it took 50 minutes and that was just a parent had rang
me to say that they needed to cancel the session (laughs).”
(Interview, Therapist, Time 2)
The nature of Lorenzo also meant that it had to be
implemented in phased releases as increasing functional-
ity became available. Consequently, paper and electronic
systems had to be run in parallel initially in order to
compensate for the limited functionality of the early
releases. Acknowledging that this temporary arrangement
may have increased workload for end-users yet further,
local implementation teams suggested possible
workarounds for users to cope with these parallel sys-
tems. These, for example, included the:
“...printing of Lorenzo notes and attaching these to
paper files, creating written notes if there are issues with
electronic notes (i.e. paper used as fallback)”. (Source:
local Deployment Verification Report)
Coping strategies employed by software users in
different contexts
We in addition observed a number of more unintended
workarounds and coping strategies employed by users
struggling to accommodate software that was perceived
to be of poor usability. Some users, particularly those
with more autonomy such as senior consultants, resisted
use altogether by insisting on using paper records.
“... medical staff sort of dig their heels in and then
don’t do it, do they and if they can get out of doing it
they’ll do it on paper...” (Interview, Administrative Staff,
Time 2).
Others, notably those who could not avoid using the
system, devised various ways to compensate for the
Table 3 Summary of data collected at each hospital
A large-scale implementation in an
acute setting
A small-scale implementation in a
community setting
A medium-scale implementation in a
mental health setting
Overarching
- 41 interviews with 27 different
interviewees (six implementation team
members including clinical leads,
managers and training professionals; 21
users including ward managers,
consultants, nurses, ward clerks,
administrative staff, pharmacists, and
junior doctors)
- 10 hours of observations
- 13 pages of researcher field notes
- Three hospital documents
- 26 interviews with 19 different
interviewees (five implementation
team members including clinical leads
and managers; 14 users consisting of
allied health professionals)
- 24 hours of observations
- Six pages of researcher field notes
- Five hospital documents
- 21 interviews with 20 different
interviewees (six implementation team
members including clinical leads and
managers; 14 users including doctors,
nurses, psychologists, social workers,
therapists, and administrative staff)
- 4.5 hours of observations
- 15 pages of researcher field notes
- Four hospital documents
14 interviews with policy
makers, system
developers, and
commercial sector
representatives
Table 4 Emerging themes from our study
Software characteristics and their
consequences
Design did not reflect reality of clinical practice
Lack of customizability
Perceived lack of fitness for purpose and lack of usability resulted in increased workloads for users
Implementation strategy soft: initially parallel use of paper: intended workarounds
Coping strategies by users in different
contexts
Some more powerful users resisted use
Embedding of the system over time in smaller scale implementations that allowed intensive user
involvement in software design
Users who could not avoid using the system devised various ways to compensate for the increasing
demands on their time and perceived shortcomings of the technology
Often workarounds were unintended by management
Direct and indirect knock-on effects Collaborative working-hierarchical structures and communication
Time spend with patients and quality of interactions
Paper: more distributed across geographical locations
Managerial outputs became unpredictable often not reflecting the reality of what actually happened
The medical record itself-delayed data entry
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increasing demands on their time and concerns about
the shortcomings of the technology. The most com-
monly employed techniques here included using other
systems to compensate (e.g. typing letters in Microsoft
Word as the spell-check was perceived to be much fas-
ter than that embedded in the software and/or reverting
to paper systems); partially using the system (e.g. not
recording certain activities if they were not viewed as
important); and using the system in ways other than
intended by management (e.g. getting around compul-
sory boxes by cross-referencing).
“So you end up, because you can’t cut and paste so you
can’t say look OK this is the same let’s cut and paste it
into here, you end up having to write it multiple, multi-
ple times or you end up having to cross-reference and I
actually think it is safer for the [patient] to have all the
risk stuff clearly and concisely written in one place. The
nature of the form means that one place isn’t the form
so I actually write it very clearly in the progress note or
the assessment form and I always in the boxes that open
up I just put ‘please refer to [name of form]’, which then
increases the amount that the risk indicator is a tick box
exercise.” (Interview, Nurse, Time 2)
Over time, some of these difficulties of integrating
Lorenzo within users’ everyday work practices attenu-
ated to some extent as they became more familiar with
the system. This was particularly true in smaller-scale
deployments in sites that had invested significant time
and resources to adapt the software to fit with their
everyday practices. In addition to more effective integra-
tion with work practices as a consequence of increased
familiarity, stakeholders reported at follow-up interviews
that, as they received system upgrades, technical perfor-
mance had improved significantly, particularly in rela-
tion to speed.
“I think the speed difference is massive from when we
first started to now, you hardly wait at all... A lot has
changed... I know the steps to take to find stuff so it’s not
a problem to find stuff.” (Interview, Allied Healthcare
Professional, Time 2)
In addition, some of the interim workarounds, such as
printing forms completed on Lorenzo and attaching
these to paper files, attenuated when the whole service
used Lorenzo. Over time, paper appeared to progres-
sively lose its significance, increasingly being used as a
“back-up system”, with users employing compensating
techniques such as, for example, performing another
activity whilst waiting for the system (such as switching
on the computer and making a cup of coffee); inputting
less descriptive data as this helped to speed up data
entry; or allocating extra time at the end of consulta-
tions for correcting spelling mistakes made whilst
typing.
Direct and indirect knock-on effects
Coping strategies employed by users had several direct and
indirect knock-on effects. These are considered below in
relation to collaborative working, patients, paper records,
managerial outputs and recording activity.
Collaborative working-hierarchical structures and
communication
The new technology impacted on the ways in which the
healthcare team interacted. This was in some instances
seen as a positive consequence, but in other situations
as a negative development. In relation to the former,
some users felt that using the system helped to make
communication more effective over longer distances.
“Yeah it is [more effective] because now we know that
definitely everybody has access so things like, so last week
we had a really urgent nail surgery on the Wednesday
and I could actually book her in to have it on the Thurs-
day knowing safely that her assessment was all there and
I didn’t have to rush off a set of notes and everything else
it was all done. And that’s only minor benefits for us but
everyday where we use it more and more now we’re
paper free we just think of more things.” (Interview,
Allied Healthcare Professional, Time 2)
On the other hand, users also reported that the system
changed the way the healthcare team interacted in nega-
tive ways. This was mainly expressed in relation to
changing professional roles and responsibilities with an
increased emphasis on administrative tasks. It was seen
as particularly problematic by clinical staff who
expressed concern that the resulting displacement of
administrative duties on to their shoulders was detract-
ing from their more pressing clinical responsibilities.
“It takes you much, much, much, much, much longer;
it doesn’t really help us at the moment. This version is
absolutely useless to be honest and yeah, it’s a waste of
time, you’re sitting in front of a computer and you
should see basically patients and doing something and so
instead of this you’re typing in something, and you’re
kind of frustrated when you wait for something that took
half a minute as a chest X-ray, it takes now at least 10
minutes...” (Interview, Junior Doctor, Time 1).
Similarly, the system tended to change professional
responsibilities, often making existing hierarchies more
visible. For example, it only allowed nurses who had
special training to order X-rays. Other nurses had to ask
the doctors to order these if necessary. In such cases,
doctors then had to complete the form, which created
more (unwelcome) work for them. Conversely, nurses
felt that some of their professional autonomy had been
eroded (although it has to be noted that officially most
nurses were not allowed to order X-rays-they were
doing it informally by completing the cards on behalf of
a doctor).
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“... for example you get a load of new doctors on the
ward and you get a patient in with a specific condition
you know automatically before the consultant even
comes round what investigations that patient is to have,
because there’s a protocol so you know what they’re
going to have or you know, because you’ve experienced
what they’re going to have so you could in effect order
them and we did do, you know, if someone came in with
renal colic I would order, you would just do it because
that’s what you knew the patient was going to have.”
(Interview, Nurse, Time 1)
Time with patients
The introduction of the new system was perceived to
reduce the time healthcare professionals could spend
with patients, leaving clinical staff frustrated, as direct
patient care was seen as more central to their role and
professional identity. The increased time spent in front
of the computer thus adversely impacted on job
satisfaction.
“I mean the fact that there’s no jobs in the NHS at the
moment is the only reason why people would have stayed
and morale has been, people are just not feeling job
satisfaction because as I say when you should be seeing
patients you’re actually sitting at a screen that is going
interminably slow.” (Interview, Therapist, Time 2)
In some instances, the technology also reduced the
perceived quality of the interaction with patients. Using
computers whilst consulting was, for example, felt to
impact on communication flow, rendering the consulta-
tion more formal and less engaging.
“It means that it’s almost like a barrier to communica-
tion because you’re having to take your eyes off that
patient and break that communication to look down at
a laptop or a computer and I don’t think that’s terribly
professional...” (Interview, Allied Healthcare Professional,
Time 1).
Other systems such as paper
It also became apparent that the introduction of the
new system not only impacted on individuals, but also
had an effect on paper records (which were, as men-
tioned above, still used in parallel). Here, paper was
often found to be more distributed across geographical
locations within healthcare settings. For example, differ-
ent users would take paper files to their desks at differ-
ent times to file the electronic print-outs whereas before
the introduction of the system all paper records were
held centrally in the reception area.
The paper comes out of a printer in his office but he
[Therapist] explains that this printer is also shared, he
signs the paper and explains that he “now have to find
the paper file to put the paper copy into it”, he says that
sometimes he cannot find the paper file as other clini-
cians might have it... (Researcher Notes, Observation).
As a result, other users needed increasingly to “chase”
paper records.
“Oh yes, I mean I’ve had one where I’ve said “I’m sure
someone has seen this case” and of course it’s just not on
the file cause it’s still with other people. And when it’s
things like medication and things like that, sometimes I’ll
just come in and I’ve not been in for a week and I just
need to pick up the file and there is nothing there and I
know she’s seen them but it’s not typed in which never
happens with notes cause they just sit there and write it
while the client is there. So it’s very time consuming.”
(Interview, Therapist, Time 2)
The medical record itself
Similarly, data entry itself was impacted upon, this in
the main manifesting as delays in transcribing the
record with the introduction of the new system. This
was due to the software being perceived as slow and as
impacting on the communication flow with the patient.
Notes were therefore often typed up at the end of the
day or, in some instances, days after the consultation
had taken place. Paper notes were used in the meantime
as reminders.
“Well at the moment because we’ve sort of piloted it on
the [name] wards we have tried to make an effort to use
[name of system] as much as possible. I mean we were
asked to try and request investigations live on the ward
rounds using a portable computer but unfortunately as I
said because of constraints of time it wasn’t possible to
use it that way, it just took too long because we, you
know, we have a fair number of patients to see in a
short space of time. And so the junior staff are making
notes of who needs which investigation and then they’re
requesting them via [name of system] at the end of the
ward round.” (Interview, Consultant, Time 1)
As a result of this delayed data entry, the new compu-
ter system was found to be less up to-date than systems
that were previously in place.
He [nurse] then puts the Smartcard [an electronic card
used for user identification] into the keyboard and picks
up a folder of patient notes on his desk, on top of the
folder is a small notepad page with some scribbles on it,
he then looks at his paper diary (like a book and full of
scribbles) and looks up when he saw the patient, “ah 2 pm
on Friday” (it’s Monday today), he says that he jots down
notes on paper “to jog my memory”, it is a girl with an
eating disorder... (Researcher Notes, Observation).
Managerial reports
Managerial outputs were also affected by the introduc-
tion of the new electronic system. When staff employed
workarounds, this would in some cases result in inaccu-
rate reports being generated by the system further down
the line, impacting on managers’ ability to track activity
levels.
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“... so you’re getting a certain amount of well I’ll just
try anything that makes it look like its worked and then
you get problems with back-end data because there’s a
diversification of the numbers of processes that people
are using cause they are just desperate to try and get
from A to B in a day and they’ll try any route to get
there that looks like it’s working to them.” (Interview,
Manager, Time 2)
An interesting example given in this context was that
users in outpatients would book appointments on the
system using a route that was less laborious, but which
meant that, although these appointments would show
on their screens as booked, they would not show on the
rest of the system as booked. As a result, managerial
outputs became so unpredictable that they in a number
of instances no longer reflected the reality of what actu-
ally happened.
Conceptualising overall consequences for work practices
ANT helped us to conceptualise changes in constella-
tions between various network components including
humans, paper and the technology. This is illustrated in
Figure 1, which depicts existing work practices before
the introduction of Lorenzo, planned changes in work
practices with the introduction of Lorenzo, and actual
changes in work practices resulting from the introduc-
tion of Lorenzo.
Discussion
Summary of main findings
The decision to nationally procure EHR systems,
coupled with the deliberate decision to limit customisa-
bility, resulted in significant changes to user work prac-
tices. Users had to adapt to a system that they did not
believe was fit for purpose. If they could not resist use,
they tended to employ workarounds which were often
unanticipated by management. These had several knock-
on effects on other factors within the hospital, including
hierarchical structures and patterns of communication
within the multi-disciplinary healthcare team, the time
and quality of interactions with patients, paper records
(which became more distributed), the timeliness of the
record itself, and managerial outputs (which became less
predictable).
Strengths and limitations of this work
Drawing on a range of data sources has allowed us to tri-
angulate our findings and gain an insight into both formal
and informal work practices associated with both intended
and unintended workarounds [42]. ANT proved useful in
guiding our data collection by placing the technology at
the heart of the investigation, helping to appreciate the
fluidity of sociotechnical processes, and the active role of
the technology on other factors around it, both human
and inanimate. It however proved less useful in explaining
changes in the technology resulting from the way it was
received by users and organisations. Other theoretical
lenses may help to address this issue, such as for example
the Strong Structuration Theory and the Social Shaping of
Technology [40,43], which emphasise the mutually shap-
ing relationship between structures and agents.
Our longitudinal design meant that we were able to
explore certain changes and developments over time, but
this was still, however, limited to early implementation
and adoption. We therefore observed certain ways in
which users accommodated the system over time, but
despite spending many months in the field we did not
have the opportunity to assess the more embedded use of
the software. Given our limited funding, we were also
unable to develop a detailed understanding of the way
healthcare workers used paper systems by examining work
practices before the introduction of the new system,
although this has often been advocated as an important
first step towards understanding how electronic systems
are likely to affect individual and collaborative work
[42,44-46].
In addition, it has to be kept in mind that: 1) work
practices are not static, but constantly changing/adapt-
ing (which complicates planning) [47]; and 2) work pro-
cesses are contingent upon situations [48]. It may be,
therefore, that over time and in different contexts users
may have developed more (or indeed less) effective ways
of using the technology. Consequently, despite our
results being likely to be transferable to similar settings
(i.e. sites implementing early releases of the same soft-
ware), they may not apply to all care activities and
situations.
Considering our findings in relation to the wider
literature
Our results have shed light on the complex conse-
quences and knock-on effects of a nationally procured
EHR system for the work practices of a range of users.
We illustrate these diagrammatically in Figure 2.
Figure 1 An ANT-based diagrammatic presentation of the
changed networks.
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Usability of the system was perceived to be lacking, as
the design of the “one-size-fits-all” technology limited
tailoring to user needs. It is commonly acknowledged
that increased customisation can facilitate the introduc-
tion of technology within user work practices [49-53],
so the finding that the relatively inflexible nature of Lor-
enzo resulted in unintended workarounds is probably
not surprising [21-23,54].
Users needed to change their work processes to fit in
with the technology; and this could be expected with the
introduction of a new system as new routines need to be
developed and existing work practices inevitably change
to some extent [14]. However, issues with poor system
usability resulted in clinicians employing informal work-
arounds to accommodate a system that was viewed as
lacking fitness for purpose and increasing workloads and
stress levels, as well as taking time away from patient
care. When examining the literature on ‘workarounds’,
most of the responses users in our study demonstrated
can be thought of as “essential hindrance workarounds”.
That is, they were used to get around perceived problems
in systems that were seen to impact on the more direct
task of care provision. Most of the workarounds we iden-
tified were also viewed as essential as they were designed
to save time that was needed for adequate patient care
[22]. However, paradoxically these workarounds,
designed to reduce the workload of users, also made the
use of the system very specific to users’ own contexts,
thereby hampering the possibility of meaningful commu-
nication between interoperable systems being used in dif-
ferent contexts [55].
We have outlined several knock-on effects of these
workarounds. Changes to existing professional responsi-
bilities, hierarchical structures and ways of collaborative
working of the multi-disciplinary healthcare team have
been found in previous studies investigating the impact
of new IT systems in healthcare settings [16,56-59].
Similarly, the finding that new technology can adversely
impact on the interactions with patients is reinforcing
existing evidence [60]. However, the effects on other
factors outside of the immediate environment of use
(e.g. organisations and paper records) are indeed new
findings, possibly because they are context dependent.
These included paper (which became more distributed),
managerial outputs (which were perceived to become
less accurate), and the timeliness of the record (as data
entry was reported as being increasingly delayed).
Although previous studies have investigated the poten-
tial impact of ‘workarounds’ on the safety and quality of
care, the mechanisms by which effects are observed are
likely to vary across settings and may not be transferable
to other IT applications [24,61].
Our findings are worrying, considering the potential
knock-on implications for the quality and safety of
patient care (e.g. if an important record is not available
when needed). It is therefore vital that these wider fac-
tors are considered when mapping anticipated changes
to work practices, which needs to be routinely and regu-
larly done by organisations preparing for changes asso-
ciated with IT applications in healthcare [62,63].
Considering the range of staff and contexts of IT use in
healthcare settings, mapping of work practices needs to
be local by definition. Likewise, emerging ‘workarounds’
are likely to reflect the idiosyncrasies of the individual
setting and are therefore highly context-dependent. This
is in itself at odds with a national implementation with
limited system customisability. Here, work practices may
be effectively mapped, but the reality of systems-in-use is
likely to vary from planned patterns as informal and
emergent work practices that characterise the dynamic
and ever-changing hospital environment are often not
taken into account [42,64]. This, in turn, may result in a
lack of attention being paid to consequences for other
stakeholders. The national nature of the implementation
means that the resulting mitigating actions are far too
slow to be visible in a timely manner to users on the
ground, limiting the potential for organisations to flexibly
address unanticipated issues [61]. This is supported by
the relative successes of small-scale EHR implementa-
tions characterised by extensive customisation of systems
to suit local needs [65].
In relation to England’s national IT strategy, a more
participatory approach to development and implementa-
tion has repeatedly been advocated [6,66,67]. For exam-
ple, Catwell and Sheikh have suggested that this should
be characterised by early user involvement and develop-
ment of a shared vision, formative evaluations and test-
ing of prototypes to assess whether the system is
perceived as usable, potential re-design so that it fits
Figure 2 Diagrammatic presentation of the desirable and
undesirable consequences of Lorenzo for user work practices.
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with users’ needs, summative evaluation and benefits
identification once implementation completed, and
incorporation of issues identified along the way [67].
Engagement and user input in design is clearly impor-
tant [6,21,66,68-71], but in line with our findings, it is
likely to be difficult to realise in the context of a centrally
procured system that is intended for implementation on
a national scale. This was found to be the case in relation
to Lorenzo, which was intended to be “co-creational” by
involving users in system design. However, the result of
the focus on interoperability was limited local input and
a resulting application that did in many instances not ful-
fill user and organisational needs. In addition, the organic
development of engagement was hampered from the start
as organisations and users were mandated to implement
and use Lorenzo. Our experiences and the wider evi-
dence-base suggest that a potential way forward may
involve implementing a combination of standardised core
solutions and customised elements, corresponding
to particular users and environments (also known as
‘configurational technology’) [72,73].
Implications for policy, practice and research
Our findings provide important insights relating to the
impact of nationally procured systems on both formal
and informal work practices of users and collaborative
working. There is clearly a need to understand better
how coordination is achieved without IT in order to
produce a system that has the ability to facilitate this
coordination or indeed revolutionise it by making pro-
cesses more effective [42]. This is likely to vary across
different settings and will warrant detailed small-scale
local studies over longer periods of time in order to
trace how work is structured with paper systems, as well
as the initial, continuing and more embedded use of
new EHR systems. As part of this work, it may be help-
ful to explore these issues from a range of theoretical
angles. These may include deliberations surrounding the
classification of an EHR system as a medical device and
associated considerations surrounding usability testing
including assessments of potentially negative conse-
quences; more specific discussion surrounding effective
leadership in organisations that have a high degree of
autonomy; and exploration of ways in which evidence-
based practice can be effectively promoted and inte-
grated within individual workflows and within political
strategies.
With regards to the impact on the quality and safety
of care, there is a need to assess outcomes identified in
our study quantitatively, in order to determine whether
the mechanisms identified are indeed contributing to
adverse patient outcomes. We do, however, acknowledge
that such studies will be challenging to design as out-
come measures may not necessarily be traceable to the
system and comparators may be difficult to identify
[74,75].
The implications for practice emerging from our
research are two-fold: firstly, there is a need to allow
local work process mapping and responses to emergent
practices and perceived inadequacies in the technological
design; and secondly, it is vital not only to assess work-
arounds employed by local users, but the reasons behind
their adoption in order to be in a position to reflect on
other downstream consequences.
Conclusions
We have identified a number of important consequences
resulting from key procurement, design and implemen-
tation decision in relation to plans to implement a
national EHR software system in England. These conse-
quences were observed in relation to healthcare staff,
organisations, medical records and patients.
We have furthermore highlighted that assessments of
workarounds and their consequences need to be locally
undertaken and addressed. In the context of the particu-
lar implementation investigated in our work, this was
inhibited by the focus on interoperability at the expense
of customisability in national efforts. The question sur-
rounding potential trade-offs between large-scale intero-
perability and local requirements is likely to be the
subject of continuous debate in England and beyond with
no easy answers in sight. Based on the findings from this
study, we suggest that concerns relating to interoperabil-
ity should not be prioritised over-and-above ensuring
that essential local needs are met. This is because a fail-
ure to address these local needs not only risks the viabi-
lity of the entire implementation effort, but it may also
severely hinder successful adoption which may result in
important adverse local consequences (as we have
shown). In addition, unintended use of local systems may
also impact on interoperability considerations in relation
to sharing of data between different healthcare providers.
This may be the case if data held within local systems
does not accurately reflect reality, potentially resulting in
inaccurate information being drawn on by other
providers.
Informal work practices, and knock-on effects are
expected to vary, but assessing and tracing changes and
effects over time is likely to pay significant returns for
the implementing organisation, users and the quality of
patient care.
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